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Abstract
This paper aims to investigate the intensity and the eectiveness of the capital con-
trols in China from 2003 to 2010, with special attention to the period of nancial tur-
bulence that erupted in the summer of 2007. We employ a two-regime threshold autore-
gressive model to study the Renminbi yield dierential between the onshore interest rate
and its non-deliverable forward (NDF)-implied oshore interest rate. We nd that the
de facto intensity of capital controls measured by the threshold increases over time, even
during the period of nancial turbulence. Moreover, a slightly lower speed of adjustment
to the threshold implies that the capital controls are eective in this context.
Keywords: Covered Interest Parity; Capital Control; China; Threshold Autoregressive
model; GARCH eect, Financial Crisis.
JEL Classi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1 Introduction
During the East-Asia nancial crisis of 1997, China's relatively closed capital accounts were
considered by some commentators to be an important element in its ability to maintain a
stable exchange rate (IMF, 2000) and in preventing it from suering harmful eects. Twelve
years later, while most European countries were experiencing the downturn triggered by the
nancial crisis of 2007, China and the developing countries of the East Asia-Pacic region
were the rst to recover from the global crisis, and it is likely that they will grow rapidly
during the next decade.
To sustain their brisk economic recovery and make global growth benet from Asian
growth, the public debate and discussions underscore the fact that capital controls limiting
capital inows (or swings in hot monies searching for higher-yielding assets) may avoid the
potential overheating and bubble formation in these emerging economies. That is important
since large and sudden capital movements can pose a risk to their economies and nancial
systems and stem the sustainability of economic recovery. Under this circumstance, it is
interesting to note how China coped with this nancial turmoil and the implied economic
slowdown. To this end, it is especially important to not look at the de jure capital controls
but at their impact through an assessment of their eectiveness.
Thus, we aim to investigate the intensity and the eectiveness of the capital controls
in China from 2003 to 2010, with special attention to the period of nancial turbulence
that erupted in the summer of 2007. The evidence is based on the covered interest parity
(CIP), with the measuring of the Renminbi (RMB) yield dierential between the onshore
interest rate and its non-deliverable forward (NDF)-implied oshore interest rate. A special
feature of this paper is that we employed a two-regime threshold autoregressive model to
study the RMB yield dierential, with the estimated thresholds determined by the intensity
of controls on capital inows and transaction costs. An increase of the threshold indicates
the strengthening of the de facto capital control intensity; a lower speed of adjustment to
the threshold implies a more eective capital control, whereas a higher speed means either
less eectiveness or a more integrated market.
Another feature of this paper is that we divided the sample into three sub-periods to
examine the eects of the Chinese exchange rate reform in 2005 and the recent global nancial
turbulence, with more attention to the latter. The nancial crisis highlighted the pivotal role
of the US dollar and gave rise to an acute dollar shortage, more acute than that of the 1950s
(Cheung et al., 2010). As for its eects on China and other Asian countries, one feature
is the stronger deviations from CIP and accompanied volatility. But what is less known
is that the nancial crisis interrupted the experiment of managing a gradual strengthening
of RMB against trading partners' currencies (Ma and McCauley, 2010). The resulting re-
linkage to the dollar would hinder the RMB's internationalization (Cheung et al., 2010),
which itself could serve to break the dependence of the international nancial system on
a currency subject to national management. In this circumstance, the investigation of the
capital controls of China and its monetary policy during this sub-period is needed.
This paper is organized as follows: in the next section, we present the capital controls
adopted in China. In section 3, main studies and methods related to covered interest parity
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are briey reviewed. In section 4, we discuss the empirical methodologies adopted: the
measuring of RMB yield dierential between onshore and oshore market, and the threshold
autoregressive model with conditional variance. Section 5 involves the data. In section 6 the
results of estimation and hypothesis testing are presented and discussed. The nal section
concludes.
2 Capital controls in China
As for the implementation of capital controls in China, the \all-included" foreign exchange
management system was replaced and transformed into a government-administrated con-
trol regime over transactions and currency exchanges in capital accounts.1 Long-run capital
inows are generally welcomed, while China maintains controls on both short-term capital
inows and outows, focusing more on the regulation of the volatility of capital ows rather
than their volumes. Quantitative and regulatory controls are implemented on the exchange
between the RMB and foreign currencies. The evolving restrictions on the nancial account
have three aspects: the management of foreign direct investments, the controls over interna-
tional portfolio investment, and controls over foreign debts. Their implementation involves
two forms of management (Zhang, 2003). First, most cross-border capital transactions need
to be approved by the relevant government departments, e.g., the Peoples Bank of China, or
regulatory authorities like the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). The Qual-
ied Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) program issued in 2002, the Qualied Domestic
Institutional Investor (QDII) program started in 2006 and its further extensions issued in
2007 and 2008 have greatly relaxed the restrictions on access by foreign investors to domestic
nancial markets and by Chinese investors to oversea nancial markets. The second form
of capital management lies in the controls imposed by the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange (SAFE) on foreign exchange transactions related to relevant capital transactions,
such as the repatriation of foreign currency-denominated funding raised overseas by domestic
companies, cross-border remittance. The strengthened supervision in 2008 on the balance of
payments by SAFE mainly takes this form, and it aims to prevent the entry of hot money
via the channels of trade, such as FDI and RMB-denominated accounts of non-residents.
In summation, Chinas controls are a direct restriction on cross-border capital ows, based
mainly on administrative approval and quantitative limitation.
3 What can we learn from the covered interest parity about
capital controls: A brief review
The covered interest parity (CIP) condition - i.e. the nullity of the covered interest dierential
- is an unalloyed criterion to judge \capital mobility" in the sense of the extent of nancial
market integration across national boundaries.2 Accordingly, CIP is widely recognized as
1The rst ocial appearance of the term \foreign exchange in capital accounts" was in the \Regulations
on the Foreign Exchange System of the People's Republic of China" promulgated in 1996.
2Other methods dening capital mobility includes Feldstein-Horioka denition (Feldstein and Horioka,
1980), real interest parity, uncovered interest parity (Frankel, 1992, 1993).
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the most appropriate indicator of the degree of the nancial integration across countries
(Frankel, 1992; Holmes and Wu, 1997; Holmes, 2001) and the indicator of capital controls;
for example, these controls have been found to interfere with the achievement of CIP in
Germany between 1970 and 1974 (Dooley and Isard, 1980) and in Japan in the 1970s (Otani
and Tiwari, 1981; Ito, 1987).
According to CIP, the interest dierential between two assets, identical in every aspect
except currency of denomination, should be zero once allowance is made for currency hedging.
Deviations from the CIP condition would reect transaction costs in a broad sense (Frankel,
1992).3 For non-comparable assets (i.e., assets issued in dierent political jurisdictions),
as concluded by Aliber (1973) in his seminal paper, political risk accounts for much of the
observed dierential. In the latest nancial turbulence, Baba and Packer (2009) rationalize
the deviation from CIP with the counterparty risk and the liquidity risk. Here we focus on
the determinants of the deviation associated with capital controls.
There are few studies in the literature about the evidence of CIP in China. The principal
reason lies in the fact that neither a liquid onshore forward exchange market nor the euro-
currency market of RMB exists before 2005. In this circumstance, the dierence between
RMB's onshore interest rate and its oshore counterpart cannot be measured directly, as
Dooley and Isard (1980) did for German Mark; neither could it be done indirectly for the
dierence of the arbitrage gains, as Ito (1987) devised for the Japanese Yen.4 Nevertheless,
with the implicit assumption that the covered interest parity condition holds for RMB in the
oshore nancial market, Ma and McCauley (2008) have calculated the yield dierentials
between the onshore interest rate of RMB and its oshore counterpart implied by CIP.
By comparing these rates between two markets, where dierent regimes of capital controls
exist, the interest rate dierential is a quantitative indicator of the eect of capital controls.
They have also shown that, even though these dierentials have been shrinking over time,
especially after abandoning the peg to USD in July 2005, capital controls in China are still
binding, as these interest rate dierentials remain large and allow the Chinese government
to retain a short-term monetary autonomy to some extent. However, their data sample does
not include the recent period of turbulence. The soar and the slump of the yield dierential
cannot be simply explained by the eectiveness or powerlessness of the capital controls. In
this context, further quantitative modeling seems necessary, and via this mean, we aim to
ll the gap and shed some light on the ecacy of China's capital controls.
3The literature has attempted to rationalize departure from CIP in terms of transactions costs (Branson,
1969; Frenkel and Levich, 1975, 1977); capital market imperfection (Prachowny, 1970; Frenkel, 1973); capital
controls (Otani and Tiwari, 1981; Frankel, 1993); data imperfection or mismatch (Taylor, 1989, 1987).
4In 1970s, Japan had separated markets under dierent capital control regimes. The arbitrage gains
derived from CIP in the oshore market represent only the transaction costs, while those derived on the
onshore market are associated with the transaction costs and capital controls in place.
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4 Methodology
4.1 Quantifying the interest yield dierential from covered interest parity
The covered parity condition holds only if the international capital movements are free from
capital controls. The ratio of the forward exchange rate to the spot rate is then equal to the
ratio of the domestic interest yield against that of its foreign counterpart:
F
S
=
1 +R
1 +RF
(1)
where F is the forward rate for a given maturity, S is the spot rate (domestic price of
the foreign currency), R is the nominal interest rate of the home currency, and RF is the
foreign interest rate. When capital controls bind, non-residents may not have full access
to the onshore monetary market; also, when an onshore forward exchange market does not
exist or the existing one is not well developed, non-residents cannot make use of the forward
exchange contracts to cover the exchange rate risk exposure of their onshore portfolios, giving
rise to the non-deliverable forward (NDF) contract.5 With this nancial instrument, a gain
equivalent to that of euro-currency deposit - which does not exist for most of the countries
having oshore NDF markets - can be obtained. Assuming that the oshore NDF market,
which is considered as a benchmark market, is very active and the CIP holds there, we have
NDF
S
=
1 + i
1 +RF
(2)
where i is the NDF-implied yield of the home currency oshore. To the extend that the
arbitrage between the onshore money market and the oshore NDF market is eectively
constrained by capital controls, the NDF-implied oshore interest rate, i, can dier con-
siderably from the interest rate prevailing on the onshore money market, R. This yield
dierential (or spread) can be written as
Y =
1 +R
1 + i
=
(1 +R)S
NDF (1 +RF )
(3)
A large and persistent onshore/oshore spread y indicates the presence of eective cross-
border restrictions.6 Moreover, a yield gap bigger than 1 implies appreciation pressures on
5Like standard forward contracts, NDF contracts x exchange rates for a future date. However, there
is no delivery of the underlying foreign currency as in forward contracts. Instead, the net US dollar is
settled with a compensating payment made or due based upon the dierence between the NDF contract
rate and the exchange rate prevailing at maturity. For more information about the NDF contracts, refer
to the Foreign Exchange Committee website (http://www.newyorkfed.org/fxc/) and the EMTA website
(http://www.emta.org/). For recent developments of Asian NDF markets and specically that of RMB NDF
market, see Ma et al. (2004), Fung et al. (2004) and Peng et al. (2007).
6Alternative way to investigate the eect of capital controls is to calculate the price dierential of RMB
exchange rate from covered interest parity, that is, assume that RMB has same interest rate in both the
onshore and the oshore markets. If the CIP holds in the oshore market, we can derive an oshore spot
exchange rate (with equation (1)) which should be equal to the quoted rate in the domestic market. A eventual
persistent dierence of this rate implies the segmented foreign exchange market due to the bindingness of
capitals controls or deviation of currency from its current equilibrium level. In fact, this approach aims to
verify the law of one price for the external value of the RMB, while we focus on the dierence of its interest
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the home currency in the presence of capital controls and vice versa.
If we assume that, on the oshore market, the CIP does not hold for some reasons
(discussed in section 6) and there exists a deviation from this parity, we write this deviation
as , and rewrite equation (2):
1 +  =
S
NDF
 1 + i
1 +RF
(4)
Y 0 =
1 +R
1 + i
=
(1 +R)S
(1 + )NDF (1 +RF )
(5)
We write equation (5) in linear form and have:
y0 = R+ s RF   ndf| {z }
y
  |{z}
latentfactor
(6)
where y0(or y), s and ndf is the logarithm of Y 0(or Y ), S and NDF respectively. y0 consists
of two parts: the yield dierentials (y) dened in Ma and McCauley (2008), which represents
capital controls and transaction costs, and some latent factor  resulting in the deviation
from CIP on the oshore market. y0 is our variable of interest and it is the yield dierential
even when the CIP does not hold in the oshore market. However, y0 is not observable
because of latent factor . Thus we calculate y and obtain y0 using a technique discussed
later.
As to the empirical approaches relevant to the deviation from CIP and consistent with
our question, this paper considers only the univariate analysis that studies the behavior and
the dynamics of y0.7 Within this branch, three mains methods can be distinguished: the rst
relies on computing actual deviations from interest parity (e.g., Frenkel and Levich, 1975),
and the second involves the stationary or unit root analysis of the deviation from CIP (e.g.,
Holmes, 2001). In this case, the speed with which deviations from CIP are eliminated is
an indicator of the eectiveness of capital controls and the extent of nancial integration
between dierent countries.8 A more recent approach consists of assuming and testing the
behaviors of deviation from CIP based on the regime (or space) they lie in by means of
estimating a threshold autoregressive model that we will present next (e.g., Peel and Taylor,
2002; Taylor and Tchernykh-Branson, 2004).9
4.2 Threshold Autoregressive (TAR) model
The TAR model was rst proposed by Tong (1978) and further developed by Tong and Lim
(1980) and Tong (1983). It is motivated by several commonly observed nonlinear charac-
yield.
7(see, e.g., Taylor and Tchernykh-Branson, 2004; MacDonald, 2007) for the multivariate regression anal-
ysis.
8Higher convergence speed implies a quicker convergence to CIP and hence tighter nancial integration.
9By estimating a band-TAR model, Peel and Taylor (2002) have supported the conjecture of Keynes
and Einzig (Keynes, 1923; Einzig, 1937) that deviations from CIP in the interwar period did not tend to be
arbitraged at all until they were of the order of fty basis points.
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teristics such as asymmetry in declining and rising patterns of a process, limit cycles of a
cyclical time series.10
A special (or restricted) case of TAR, called the Band-TAR model, was rst applied
by Obstfeld and Taylor (1997) for testing the theory of purchasing power parity and the
nonlinear adjustment of price.11 It has also been employed to investigate the validity of
CIP by taking into account arbitrage costs in the nancial market (e.g., Peel and Taylor,
2002; Taylor and Tchernykh-Branson, 2004).12 The presence of xed costs does not allow
the agents to adjust continually their positions. Within the band implied by the transaction
costs, the agent will not arbitrage, as the CIP would not apply: the deviation from CIP
follows a random walk. Outside the band, unexploited prot triggers arbitrage which reverts
the deviation from CIP to the edge of the band, with this process characterized by an
autoregressive model (AR(1), for example). A simple version of such Band-TAR model may
be written as:
yt =
8><>:
out(yt 1   cup) + outt if yt 1 > cup;
inyt 1 + int if clow  yt 1  cup;
out(yt 1   clow) + outt if yt 1 < clow;
(7)
where cup (clow) is the upper (lower) threshold; outt is N(0; 
out2), int is N(0; 
in2), here
in could be restricted to zero, and out is the convergence speed outside the thresholds of
arbitrage (or inaction).
The TAR model outlined above has three regimes and two thresholds. However, when
the theory is not specic about the complete structure of the model, the number of regimes
(or thresholds) in the model cannot be assumed to be known a priori. As our specication
is supported by the transaction cost theory, the assumption of such a band-TAR model
oers a simple interpretation of the results.13 Hutchison et al. (2009) use this three-regime
TAR model to investigate capital control liberalization in India. Nevertheless, we apply
some formal tests to conrm this hypothesis of nonlinearity or even further the number of
thresholds if the linearity is rejected.14
As shown in Figure 3, there are insucient data points during the sample period that will
pass through the lower threshold, which is supposed to be negative. This is explained by the
pressure exerted by capital inows to China and by the corresponding bindingness of capital
controls. Therefore, we cannot identify the asymmetric band TAR model outlined above.
Nevertheless, Taylor and Tchernykh-Branson (2004) point out that this is the case in most
10For a brief discussion of the theoretical and empirical motivations of this class of model, see, e.g.,Hansen
(1999).
11A standard model with transportation costs implies that real exchange rates should follow a band thresh-
old model in which the process is a random walk within the band and a mean reversion outside it.
12To test the law of one price and to shed some light on the international nancial integration, Levy Yey-
ati et al. (2009) estimate an augmented Band-TAR model with generalized autoregressive conditional het-
eroskedastic (GARCH) eect for the cross-market premium of the stock price.
13A non-arbitrage band exists for small deviations from the CIP. The upper and the lower thresholds are
determined by intensity of the capital controls and transaction costs.
14Tsay (1989) proposed a graphical approach for locating the values of the thresholds and the number
of the regimes. Alternatively, Hansen (1999) has generalized the sup-LR test and sequential least squares
estimations to the SETAR models with more than two regimes.
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emerging markets, which lead consequently to the specication of a single upper threshold
model (e.g., Figure 2).15 We follow this approach and write the model of the form:16
yt =
(
out(yt 1   cup) + outt if yt 1 > cup
int if yt 1  cup
(8)
When cup is known, simple least-squares methods can be applied to each subset of the data
partitioned by the single threshold. In the absence of prior knowledge about the thresh-
old, we can still estimate this model via a grid search of all possible values of the threshold
variable (here yt 1), which either minimizes the sum of squared residuals or maximizes
the log-likelihood function of the model.17 For correcting the autocorrelation and the het-
eroskedasticity prevalent in the residual, we rene the model by adding the lag(s) of the
dependent variable and the GARCH eect, as in Levy Yeyati et al. (2009), and rewriting it
as
yt = 1out
out(yt 1   cup) + 1in(inyt 1 + Cin) +
kX
j=1
jyt j + t
2t = 0 +
pX
j=1
j
2
t j +
qX
j=1
j
2
t j (9)
where 1in(1out) is the indicator function and is equal to 1 when yt 1 < cup (yt 1  cup) and 0
otherwise, Cin is the constant term in the inner regime. In this specied TAR (2,k,d) model,
2 is the number of regimes, k is the augmented lag length, and d is the delay parameter. As
we will detail later, we divide our sample into three sub-periods, as the structural change
and the outbreak of the nancial crisis are represented in our data, and we set k to 0 or 1
to correct for the autocorrelation in the residuals. Due to the lack of a precise theoretical
prior about the delay parameter d, we set it to 1 for all sub-samples, following on this the
existing studies (e.g. Bec et al., 2004; Bec and Ben Salem, 2004).18 in and out represent
the convergence speed in the no-arbitrage and arbitrage regime, respectively.19 Moreover,
we assume the same error terms and conditional variance for both of the two regimes.20
15They estimate a single-threshold model for the deviation from the CIP of Thai baht, Indonesian rupiah,
Philippine peso, Singapore dollar, Korean won and Taiwan dollar, with the covered interest arbitrage involving
the arbitrage along the term structure.
16Once the data allow with longer time span, the asymmetric band-TAR model could be estimated in
the same way, by adding another dimension in the grid search of the thresholds that we discuss later in this
subsection.
17When the threshold variable for the grid search is the lagged value of the dependent variable with delay
d (here d = 1), the TAR model is called self-exciting TAR or SETAR. See Mignon and Dufrenot (2004) for an
application of the SETAR to the French consumption and its determinants. The Band-TAR model estimated
in this paper is an extended SETAR model with some restrictions. We simply use TAR hereafter.
18Based on their simulation, Bec and Ben Salem (2004) pointed out that the estimator of this parameter
is particularly unreliable for the series showing a certain degree of persistence.
19If the estimated coecient of in is not signicant (as we expected according to the assumption that the
yield dierentials follow a random walk within the band), we can estimate a restricted model by imposing
this coecient to zero.
20In other words, here we assume that the threshold eect exists only in the mean equation. See, e.g.,
Obstfeld and Taylor (1997); Taylor and Tchernykh-Branson (2004) for the cases in which the variance is as-
sumed dierent for each regime; and Glosten et al. (1993) for a threshold (or asymmetric) volatility (GARCH)
model. Another extension is to relax the assumption of same error terms and same conditional variance in the
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The number of ARCH and GARCH terms (p and q) could be specied dierently for each
sub-sample. Generally, a GARCH (1,1) is sucient for each sub-sample to take into account
the heteroskedasticity.21
We estimate the outlined model by following the procedure described in Obstfeld and
Taylor (1997): by a grid search - for the potential threshold - on all values of the threshold
variable, we estimate the TAR model with the threshold which maximizes the log likelihood
ratio LLR = 2(La Ln), in which La (Ln) is the log likelihood of the alternative TAR model
(null AR model).22 The likelihood function of the above TAR can be written as
La
 
out; in; 2; cup; Cin

=  1
2
X
t
[ln(2) + 2t =
2] (10)
Once the TAR model is estimated, we can run a threshold test as a test of specication for
checking the adequacy of the TAR alternative relative to the AR null. Because the threshold
is not dened under the null, the LLR does not follow the standard 2 distribution, and
the standard inference is invalid. One way to resolve this problem is to use the Monte
Carlo simulation to derive the critical value of the LLR test (e.g., Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997;
Hansen, 1999): estimate and t an AR (1) null model with GARCH eect on the actual
data (y1;    ; yT ). With estimated parameters, we simulate the tted linear model.23 We
then estimate the TAR model for each simulated series and calculate the corresponding LLR.
The empirical distribution of the LLR is then tabulated and used as an inference to judge
the alternative TAR model against the AR null. However, this method suers from the
tail heaviness of the residuals which violate the hypothesis of normally distributed residual
assumed in the aforementioned Monte Carlo simulation; consequently, the LLR test may
have low power.24
5 Data
Our sample for computing the yield dierential spans from May 6th, 2003 to December
12, 2010. The short span of the sample is dictated by the availability of the data. The
onshore-oshore Chinese currency (RMB) yield dierential is derived from the RMB spot
rate, the 3-month RMB NDF rate, the 3-month US dollar LIBOR rate and the 3-month
PBOC (People's Bank of China: Central Bank of China) bill rate (proxy of the onshore
dierent regimes, and to specify a model with threshold eect in both the mean and the variance equations.
21Generally, lower orders such as (1,1), (1,2) and (2,1) are adopted in applications since higher orders
models are dicult to estimate and to interpret.
22Maximizing this ratio equals the maximization of the log likelihood function of the TAR alternative
mentioned earlier. To ensure an adequate number of observations on each side of the threshold (or in each
threshold space), here we exclude the highest 15% and the lowest 15% values of the threshold variable from
the grid search, as widely implemented in practice.
23For example, 600 simulations are generated for the tted model. We start each simulation with y b = 0,
end at yT , and then discard the rst b (set to 50) to avoid the initial value bias.
24Hansen (1999) provides an alternative simulation approach based on bootstrap, instead of supposing
other possible forms of distribution, such as the Student-t distribution, the Generalized Error distribution
(GED) and the skewed-Student distribution. However, simulate with bootstrapping an augmented AR(1)
model with GARCH eect complicates the traditional Monte Carlo procedure and is very time-consuming.
Hence, we leave it for the future research, and simply use, in this paper, the test of specication based on the
simulation aforementioned, with caution when the TAR alternative is rejected.
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interest rate).25 Datasets used for calculation, estimation and hypothesis testing are of daily
frequency and extracted from Datastream and Bloomberg.
Despite the relatively short sample span, it is possible to have some structural breaks
or dramatic policy changes during the entire period, particularly the global crisis of 2007.
Actually, we divide the whole sample into three sub-samples as follows: the rst period
(5/06/2003-7/20/2005), the second (7/21/2005-8/8/2007) and the third (8/9/2007-2/12/2010),
based principally on the historical events that may have an impact on the monetary or for-
eign exchange policy. Two eventual structural changes are documented in the literature.
The rst event was the reform of the Chinese exchange rate regime taken into eect in July
2005, which ended the peg of RMB to USD and created a managed oat based on a basket
of currencies.26 The second one was the recent nancial turmoil triggered in August 2007,
with August 8 considered as the timing of the break (e.g., Taylor and Williams, 2008a,b;
Baba and Packer, 2009). We implement the hypothesis testing and the estimation on these
sub-periods, respectively.27 Furthermore, with the test of Lee and Strazicich (2003), which
can identify the structural changes and at the same time test for stationarity, we compare
these dates with our ex ante choices.
6 Empirical Results
The yield dierentials are calculated based on the equation (5) for the 3 month maturity
and plotted in Figure 3 for the whole period. The substantial and persistent RMB yield
dierential may indicate large transactions costs and imply that the capital controls are
eective.28 As for the speed of reversion to \equilibrium", we rely on a TARmodel with upper
threshold as described above. Before presenting the results of estimation, some preliminary
analysis is implemented.
6.1 Unit Root (UR) Analysis
If the yield dierentials have a unit root, this indicates that the deviations are persistent
and not mean reverting, which implies that capital controls are eective enough to maintain
a gap between the onshore and the oshore RMB interest rate. In contrast, the stationary
characteristics represent a process of returning to the equilibrium level, via the activity of
arbitrage in the market. Furthermore, the speed of the convergence can be calculated by
estimating the autoregressive parameter of the stationary process validated. A relatively
low speed can still imply the binding control on capital ows. However, high-speed mean-
reversion may indicate the ineectiveness of capital controls or a higher degree of nancial
market integration.
25For the reason why these proxies are chosen and for a detailed description of their characteristics, see,
e.g.,Ma and McCauley (2008). Data for the PBOC bill rate are only available from May 6th, 2003.
26However, several authors have doubts about the real eect of this change (see, e.g., Goldstein and Lardy,
2006; Shah et al., 2005).
27By distinguishing three sub-periods based on the breaks in the vehicle of American monetary policy, Bec
and Ben Salem (2004) test the unit root and apply a threshold error correction model to the interest rate
term spread for both the whole period and each sub-period.
28Table 1 summarizes the means and the t-statistics of the measured yield dierentials for dierent sub-
periods.
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Following the traditional practice in the literature, non-stationarity check is executed
before specifying the linear (or nonlinear) characteristic of the series. However, standard UR
tests are known to be biased toward the non-rejection of a unit root when they are applied
to time series with non-linear dynamics.29 Numerous UR tests with various hypotheses of
non-linearity can be used to increase the power of the UR test. Here, we only apply the
generalized least squares (GLS) UR test (NP test hereafter) of Ng and Perron (2001) and
the Momentum-TAR test of Enders and Granger (1998), which assumes a M-TAR model in
the alternative. Our statistical inferences are mainly based on the latter, whereas the former
is for comparison.30
The two UR tests are applied to the whole sample and to each sub-sample, with the results
reported in Table 2. Not surprisingly, for the whole sample, both lead to the rejection of the
UR null, as the tests become biased because of the structural changes. To adequately model
and carefully investigate the series of the yield dierentials, we also apply these two tests to
each sub-sample. The results do not always provide the same evidence; the NP test cannot
reject the UR null for any of the three sub-periods (see Table 2), implying the absence of the
mean reversion of the yield dierential, while the M-TAR test only accepts the UR for the
third sub-period. Based on the results of M-TAR test during the rst two sub-periods, the
yield dierentials are stationary but nonlinear. As to the third one (the period the nancial
turbulence), even with the same conclusion of the two tests, we accept the non-stationarity
of the yield dierential with caution.31 The reason for this violation of the interest rate
parity is still unclear: is it induced by the liquidity risk or the strengthening of the capital
controls or even both? We provide an answer at the end of this section.
Finally, the UR test proposed by Lee and Strazicich (2003)(LS test hereafter) is used to
identify the structural changes. Their minimum Lagrange multiplier unit root test endoge-
nously determines the location of (up to) two structural breaks in level and/or in trend, and
tests the null of a unit root, without diverging in the presence of breaks under the null.32
The results are shown in Table 3; for the timing of the structural breaks, the rst one ba-
sically corresponds to the date of the exchange rate regime reform, whereas the second one
fails to conrm the advent of the nancial crisis. Because the timing of the breaks may be
data dependent, we keep our dates of breaks exogenously determined under the guidance
of historical facts. As for the result of the unit root of the LS test, the fact that the null
cannot be rejected is possibly due to the aforementioned low power of the test when the
29For the discussion on the low power of the traditional unit root tests in the presence of asymmetric
adjustment, see, e.g., Enders and Granger (1998).
30Using Monte Carlo experiment, Choi and Moh (2007) showed that the M-TAR test and the Inf   t test
due to Park and Shintani (2005) outperform the others, and that they have reasonable power of discerning
the unit root.
31The results of Choi and Moh (2007) also indicate that the often claimed \unit-root rst, nonlinearity
second" approach will be of reduced merit when the associated AR parameters take large values. Since this
makes challenging for the extant technical devices to detect the stationarity of the processes with high AR
parameter, regardless of their nonlinearity. They suggest that what determines the power of unit root tests is
not the specic type of nonlinearity in the alternative model, but how far the alternative model is away from
the unit root process. The procedure proposed by Harvey and Leybourne (2007) provides an alternative for
testing the linearity before checking the UR.
32Alternatively, Hutchison et al. (2009) employ the method suggested by Bai and Perron (1998) to detect
the structural changes. We do not adopt this approach because of the technical constraint on the sample size
(less than 500 observations) of their GAUSS code.
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non-linearity is not specied in the alternative.33
6.2 AR vs.TAR
Although the TAR model has theoretical support, it is nevertheless worth searching for its
empirical support by testing the existence of threshold-type nonlinearity before its estima-
tion. Can linearity be rejected? Even in that case, is the outlined TAR model well specied?
The result of M-TAR does not give a clear-cut answer, as the rejection of the unit root null
does not imply that the real data denitely follow the process of M-TAR, notably because
the non-linear alternative could be misspecied. To answer these questions, we apply several
widely used linearity tests: the F-test of Tsay (1989), the sup-LM test of Hansen (1996),
and our simulation-based log likelihood ratio test (LLR test) as the tests of specication for
the TAR model.34
For the rst two ready-to-wear tests, tting an AR (k) model (n is the nth of lags) for each
sub-sample is needed to assure that the residuals contain no serial correlation. Then, these
two tests are applied to the residuals; the results are reported in Table 5. Tsay's test rejects
the linearity only for the corrected series of third period, and Hansen's test only for the rst
period. We provide two main possible explanations for this failure of non-rejecting the linear
null: rst, these two tests assume homoskedastic errors, which are evidently not the case for
our samples. Second, failing to reject the linearity may be explained by the non-stationarity
of volatility of the specied linear model, that is, the sum of 1 and 1 superior to 1 (see
the coecients of variance equation reported in Table 4),35 because the non-stationarity of
volatility may aect the consistency, convergence rates and asymptotic distributions of the
coecients.36 Turning on our LLR test, the linearity is rejected at 5% but only for the rst
sub-period (see LLR test in Table 5).37 In view of the absence of the unanimous rejection of
linearity, the presence of non-stationarity volatility in the linear autoregressive model, and
the low power of the simulation-based LLR test for discerning the competing models, we
focus on the specied TAR model and compare with its linear counterpart for a balanced
interpretation.
Following the method described in subsection 4.2, we estimate the threshold and the
TAR model using the same specication as the AR-GARCH model. When some estimated
coecients are not signicant, we impose some restrictions on the tted models and re-
estimate them. The results are reported in Table 6.
33The construction of an UR test with the nonlinear alternative capable of detecting the structural breaks
is expected for the future study, which is out of scope of this paper.
34For a comparison and an application of the two former linearity tests, see Ben Salem and Perraudin
(2001).
35Petrucelli and Woolford (1984) show that the necessary and sucient conditions for the stationarity of
yt 1 is: in < 0, out < 0 and (1 + in)(1 + out) < 0 for any value of c. In our case, the ARCH and
the GARCH eect are signicant for all sub-samples, while the volatility is stationary only in the second
sub-sample.
36However, Xu (2008) proved that the non-stationary volatility generally changes the convergence rates of
the trend estimates to the true values and may lead to inconsistent estimation, while those of the autoregressive
slope estimates are not penalized.
37As discussed in 4.2, because of the low power of LLR test, the probability with which the TAR model is
mistakenly rejected is high.
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6.3 CIP before September 2007
Here we discuss the results of the estimation for each sub-period. The estimated upper
threshold indicates the de facto extent of capital controls, and the autoregressive parameter
measures the speed of convergence to the zero-prot point under the force of arbitrage. Before
the abandonment of the dollar peg of RMB in July 2005, the threshold estimated is about
200 base points, which approximates its unconditional mean (367 points, see Table 1), and it
indicates the extent of capital controls and pure transaction costs. Below the threshold, the
yield dierential follows a random walk and reverts to it under the force of the arbitrage when
it lies above the threshold but with a low speed (half life of 36 days). The AR model reports a
shorter HL of 21 days. Both of them show a long HL of mean reversion and a non-stationary
volatility (the sum of 1 and 1 is bigger than 1), allowing us to conclude on the market
segmentation and the eectiveness of the capital controls. The non-stationary volatility is
possibly due to the short period of the data. In other words, as the mean-reversion is long,
the conditional variance does not end the reverting cycle during the short time of the rst
sub-period.38 Actually, since 2002, the expectation of the revaluation has been reinforced,
along with the leap of current account surplus and the accumulation of the US dollar as the
foreign exchange reserve, and the forward premium has increased gradually. However, the
dollar peg was well maintained until the reform.39 Meanwhile, the evolution of the RMB
interest rate (PBOC bill rate) did not follow, and it even runs in the opposite direction to
the US Libor, indicating an autonomy of monetary policy (see Figure 5). In this context, the
xed exchange rate regime is maintained through the eective restrictions on cross-border
capital ows, which are represented by the persistent and volatile yield dierential.
After the introduction of the new managed oat regime in July 2005, the threshold
estimated by the TAR model, contrary to what was expected, increased to about 270 base
points, even exceeding its reduced unconditional mean. Nevertheless, a half life (HL) of
only 3 days indicates a more unied and active monetary and exchange market where the
unexploited prots are quickly reduced by arbitrage to the threshold once the yield dierential
exceeds it. In contrast to the TAR model, the linear AR reports a longer HL (about 14 days),
which is still lower compared to the one of the rst sub-period. The signicant constant term
in the dierenced mean equation indicates a positive trend in the level of the yield dierential.
It means that the extent of the de facto capital control increases over time. Moreover, even if
the conditional variance persists, the volatility becomes stationary according to both models,
providing more evidence of the increased liquidity of this market.
Here we provide some possible explanations for the increased threshold and the far shorter
HL. On the one hand, the higher threshold implies that during this sub-period capital controls
are still binding and that the extent of the controls is even strengthened. This is mainly due
to some policy measures introduced later in this sub-period targeting the short-term cross-
38The author acknowledges Jin-Chuan Duan for this point. The short sample is due to the data availability
of the PBOC bill rate. When we use China Interbank Oered Rate (Chibor) as the proxy of onshore interest
rate, we obtain the stationary volatility. Since the central bank bill rate is more liquid and a better proxy for
the onshore interest rate than the Chibor, we keep using this rate to estimate our TAR model for all three
sub-periods.
39See Ma and McCauley (2010) for the evidence.
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border nancial activities; one such measure is the guideline issued by SAFE in October
2006 on restricting mainland entities' participation in NDF market. This is in response to
the participation of some mainland entities, mainly corporations for hedging purpose, in
arbitrage between markets. This result is consistent with the explanation that for the initial
episode of the new regime, considered a transitional phase, the narrowing of the onshore
and oshore RMB yield dierential is a chosen policy outcome rather than as the waning
eectiveness of the capital controls interpreted by market observers (see Ma and McCauley,
2008), which is used to interpret the much lowered unconditional mean after the regime
change. On the other hand, the quick mean-reverting process (or a shorter HL) implies that
once the unexploited prot appears and exceeds the transaction costs and risk associated
with capital controls, the active arbitrage funds take swift action, despite binding capital
controls. This action reduces quickly the yield dierential to the level of the threshold.
There is a considerable but well-managed appreciation of RMB against the dollar and a
clear co-movement between the NDF and the spot rate during this period. However, what
is less known is that it was managed against a basket of trading partner currencies, with
a moderate (2% per annum) upward crawling and within narrow (2%) bands (Ma and
McCauley, 2010).40 Meanwhile, a persistent and sizable gap between the RMB onshore
rate and the US Libor rate has been maintained, in spite of the similar trends, suggesting
that Chinese monetary authorities could still use independent domestic policy in an eort
to prevent the economy from overheating and curb accelerating ination. The PBOC has
increased the lending rates ve times during this period. All of these facts in 2007 corroborate
the eectiveness of capital controls.
6.4 Capital controls since nancial crisis
Entering into a period of turbulence, the upward and downward spirals of the yield dierential
could not be fully explained by the eventual strengthening of capital controls implemented
by the Chinese government. A look at both the countries with high nancial integration
(Figure 1) and some Asian economies with NDF markets (Figure 2 and Table 7) reveals
some common factor(s) which can explain the abnormal behavior of the yield dierentials.
For those major currencies, the appearance and even the persistence of deviation from
CIP during periods of uncertainty and turmoil are not a recent story (e.g., Taylor, 1989).
However, the liquidity risk caused by the US dollar funding shortage of non-US institutions
and the signicantly increased counterparty risk have been documented as the main reasons
for the deviation of CIP in the recent turmoil. Furthermore, the dollar Libor has been re-
ported to have underestimated the funding costs that European nancial institutions actually
faced, as the measurement error of the true dollar funding costs over the period could have
increased and therefore been misleading (e.g., Baba et al., 2008; Baba and Packer, 2009).41
40The period of this stable managed oat regime spans from June 2006 to May 2008.
41Because of perceived heightening of counterparty risk and their own increased demand for dollar liquidity,
the US nancial institutions were reluctant to lend dollars to their non-US counterparts, making the interbank
market dried up. Thus European banks took the foreign exchange swap market as the important source of
US dollar funding for matching their sharply increased dollar assets. Even the FX swaps can be viewed as
eectively collateralized transactions, the collateral does not cover the entire counterparty risk, which will be
added as premia to the elevated cost of raising dollars.
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After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the dollar liquidity problem for European banks
deepened and translated into a phenomenon of global dollar shortage.
In this context, the impact of the nancial turmoil on the evolution of yield dierentials
can be represented by a few latent common factors mentioned above, especially the liquidity
risk (e.g., Baba and Packer, 2009; Levy Yeyati et al., 2009; Fong et al., 2010). Here we use
factor analysis based on a principal component approach to estimate this latent factor for
six Asian economies active on the NDF market.4243 The results are reported in Table 8 and
Table 9.44 We then regress the raw data of yield dierential of the third period over the rst
factor index, which measures the increased liquidity risk associated with the nancial crisis.
The residual of this common factor is the \deated series", with which the alternative model
is estimated and the hypothesis testing is implemented.
These corrected yield dierentials are plotted in Figure 3, accompanied by the raw series
of the whole sample. Its volatility (the standard deviation) is halved compared to the original
data (see also the last row of Table 1), but still higher than the rst two sub-periods. During
the period of turbulence, the yield dierentials are mean reverting, as shown in the results of
the UR tests (see last row of Table 2). An HL of about 10 days (shorter than in the second
sub-period) estimated by the linear AR model conrms this result, even though this model
reports a non-stationary volatility (see Table 4). In contrast with the model estimated using
the original data of the period of turmoil, the HL are much shorter once the volatility is
deated. In other words, when the dollar funding shortage triggers the lack of liquidity; the
liquidity risk premium incurs extra volatility, makes the mean-reverting process much slower
and consequently creates the illusion that the longer HL reects tighter and more eective
capital controls, which may not exist. Therefore, the comparison between the HL estimated
with raw series and that of corrected series shows that the longer HL induced by liquidity
risk or some other factor during the period of turbulence makes the interpretation of HL by
the eectiveness of the capital controls insucient and misleading.
Our TAR model results show an increase in the threshold to 315 basis points (see Table
6) while the HL (about 4 days) is slightly extended, indicating that the extent of the de
facto capital control has been strengthened during the crisis. For instance, in August 2008,
the issued regulation requires companies with FDI to submit the certied reports of their
capital denominated in foreign currency, aiming to limit the inows of \hot money" via the
aforementioned FDI channels. As for the HL, estimated either by AR or TAR model, it
changes only slightly relative to that of the second sub-period, implying that the markets
are more and gradually integrated with the advent of new currency regime, even if they were
42In the oshore markets like Hong Kong and Singapore where the Asian NDF transactions are highly
active, there are less conterparty risk since the NDF contracts do not entail currency delivery of the notional
amounts at the maturity.
43Alternative way to estimate the latent common factor is to use a dynamic factor model based on Kalman
ltering, and this could be an extension of this paper.
44Two common factors are retained (bold face gures in upper panel of Table 8) based on Kaiser criterion
which drops all components with eigenvalues less than 1. Varimax rotation is then used to dierentiate the
original variables by extracted factor. Each factor will tend to have either large or small loadings of any
particular variable, in our case the rst factor (we assume it as the liquidity risk) has large positive loadings
on twd, inr, and cny (see lower panel of Table 8). We restart the factor analysis only on these three variables,
and obtain the index of this rst common factor (see Table 9).
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partly aected by the nancial turbulence.
In fact, with the eruption of nancial turmoil and the continual dollar depreciation against
most major currencies (see Figure 4), there has been more Western short-term capital pursu-
ing high earnings ow into emerging Asian markets, causing the appreciation of these Asian
currencies, and the expectation of a further and more rapid appreciation of the RMB than
what the spot rate actually had. This increases the forward discount. Afterward, there is
even expectation of depreciation at the end of 2008 when the PBOC return to the dollar
peg as a special measure during the nancial turmoil. The uctuation of NDF makes the
forward premium and consequently the RMB yield dierential volatile.
In the monetary market, the interest gap was reduced (middle panel of Figure 5) to
the proximity of interest rate parity after the failure of Lehman Brothers. To attenuate
the shock on the domestic economy and stimulate the domestic consumption, the Chinese
monetary authority has adopted an expansionary monetary policy, decreasing the benchmark
deposit and lending rate ve times and the deposit reserve requirement ratio four times since
September 2008 (until October 2010). This is in line with the purpose of the US Federal
Reserve to provide the liquidity to the market. The introduction of the RMB currency swap
market in August 2008 and that of the foreign exchange dealer system into the interbank
foreign exchange market in October of the same year can be interpreted as a commitment of
the Chinese government to further develop and deepen the foreign exchange market and to
increase the liquidity of the associated derivatives market, which is an important condition
to facilitate the outward foreign investment and to compensate the inows of hot money.
This could explain the rapid reversion to the threshold when excessive prot emerged in
the market. Since the quick recovery of Chinese economic growth, the interest rate was
moderately adjusted upward, resulting in a persistent gap with the US Libor. In sum, with
this evidence, we witness that during the nancial turmoil the de facto intensication of
capital controls translated into an increased threshold. We also nd that the eectiveness of
the capital controls, as the speed of adjustment (the HL) was slightly reduced. However, in
spite of this slower adjustment, it is still much quicker than during the period of the dollar
peg, which implies that the development of a more liquid foreign exchange market is not
fully hindered by the nancial turbulences.
6.5 Robustness Check
6.5.1 Conditional on de jure Capital Controls
Government policies restricting capital ows are never perfect in that individuals and rms
always nd ways to circumvent regulations for higher returns available. Thus, even if the
legal restrictions remain unchanged, the measure of de jure capital controls may not capture
the degree or the eectiveness of their enforcement, which can change over time (Kose et al.,
2009). Because capital control policies may change during the sample period, it is better
to control this variable to check for their ineectiveness. Specically, the capital control
relaxation of some extent allows a more open capital account and may reduce the yield dif-
ferential or the threshold, while it does not mean a non-eective capital control. Alternative
(de jure) capital control indices are constructed to represent the evolution of the policy and
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are widely used in empirical studies.4546 One incompatibility of these indices, let alone their
intrinsic drawbacks when constructed, is that they are time-invariant during our sample pe-
riod, whereas the degree of capital control appears not to be constant.47 Accordingly, we
assume in this paper that China's overall de jure degree of capital control is constant during
the sample period and estimate the de facto capital control intensity represented by the
estimated threshold for each sub-period under this hypothesis.
6.5.2 Conditional on Expectation of Forward Exchange Rate
The NDF rates are determined outside China on the oshore market which is deeper and
more liquid than the onshore market. They are the results of the interplay between market
forces and may be interpreted as a proxy of market expectation for RMB's future exchange
rate (Cheung and Qian, 2010).48 In this context, the NDF-implied interest yield dierential
also depends on exchange rate expectations. If the expectation reverses, the implied oshore
RMB interest rate and consequently the yield dierential measuring the degree of capital
control may change equally without any change in capital control policy (see equation (6)).
Following Cheung and Qian (2010), we calculate the deviation from CIP using the RMB
deliverable forward rate of Chinese onshore market, which has developed recently and rapidly
after the reform of exchange rate regime in 2005 but remains shallow and strictly regulated.
The advantage of this onshore rate is that its pricing is mainly inuenced by the CIP (see
Peng et al., 2007). With this less expectation-driven rate, we re-estimate the outlined TAR
model as a robustness check.49
The calculated covered interest deviation shows a similar pattern as the yield dierential
derived with NDF, especially for the period of turmoil, but both the level and the volatility
are signicantly reduced in this case. What is entirely dierent is that, during the sub-period
after the 2005 reform and before nancial turmoil, this deviation uctuated around zero.
A much lower estimated threshold (43 versus 272 estimated with NDF) distinguishes two
stationary regimes for which the deviations from CIP are mean reverting. More surprisingly,
the adjustment to the threshold is more rapid for the non-arbitrage regime, with a HL
of only 1.2 days relative to 5.2 days of the arbitrage regime. However, this last result is
45For example, using the capital control index compiled by Chan-Lee (2002) as proxy, Cheung et al. (2006)
include the degree of nancial account restrictions to explain the deviation from uncovered interest parity
between China and some other economies; Cheung and Qian (2010) include a dummy variable to take into
account the change of capital control policy when studying the deviation from the covered interest parity
between China and the U.S..
46It captures the shift of China's policy bias from tightening to loosening and from primarily controlling
outow to controlling both inows and outows. It is assigned a value of +1 for the observations before
September 2001, when China tightened capital outow; a value 0 for the observations between September
2001 and October 2002, when it is deemed as a transition period; and a value -1 for the observations after
October 2002, when Chinese authorities started to encourage or promote capital outow.
47In Cheung and Qian (2010), no extra dummy variable that captures the timing of China's capital control
policy changes has been introduced after October 2002; the nancial openness index for China of Chinn and
Ito (2008) is constant from 1993.
48The pricing of the RMB NDF is proved not tied to its nancial fundamentals (Peng et al., 2007).
49We estimate only for the second and the third sub-periods since this onshore market-based forward rate
did not exist before the reform of 2005. Aforementioned statistical tests are applied to this deviation, with
the results allowing us to estimate the TAR model. These results are not reported here because of limit of
space, but available upon request.
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counterintuitive and is not easy to interpret. In contrast, the linear specication produces a
HL of 3.6 days, which is in the neighborhood of that estimated with NDF series.
For the period of turmoil, the estimated threshold is about 83 basis points, almost double
relative to the previous sub-period. However, the quicker adjustment pattern in the non-
arbitrage regime during the rst two sub-periods has been sustained until the period of crisis.
Moreover, the adjustments to the threshold in both regimes have slowed correspondingly
(with HL of 10.7 and 2.3 respectively). The linear estimation of HL shows a lower speed of
adjustment to zero than its counterpart in the quiet sub-period (about 17 days). Estimated
with NDF, the linear (TAR) HL is 10 days (4 days).
In summary, the use of the onshore forward rate of RMB (which is less inuenced by
the expectations of currency appreciation or depreciation) reduces both the level and the
volatility of deviation (or yield dierential) from CIP.50 It also decreases the thresholds
that indicate the de facto degree of capital control. However, the threshold is found to
increase during the period of nancial turmoil and is similar to the result obtained using
the NDF-based TAR model, which partly conrms the robustness of our conclusion. As for
the threshold gap between the onshore forward-based and NDF-based estimations, it may
be due to the understatement of the deviation from CIP and consequently the intensity of
capital control by using onshore forward rate. In spite of the pricing based on CIP, the
onshore forward market is shallow relative to the NDF market because of the \real demand
principal" and restrictive regulations on participants (Peng et al., 2007). Therefore, the
capital controls persist even if the deviation does not, as the onshore forward is less liquid
and may be unrepresentative. Based on this reason, the results from the TAR model with the
NDF series are still informative and robust. After all, because the onshore forward market
develops and deepens, there may be some information transmission from the CIP-based
onshore forward rate to the NDF rate. It makes the NDF rate not so much expectation-
driven and still acceptable for measuring the yield dierential of currencies.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper proposes an assessment of the eectiveness of the capital controls in China. Using
a two-regime TAR model, it studies the RMB interest yield dierential between the onshore
rate and the NDF-implied oshore rate for the period from mid-2003 to the beginning of
2010. With the threshold and half-life (HL) estimated for each sub-period, we nd that the
de facto intensity of capital controls increases over time, as reected by the rising threshold
of arbitrage, even during the period of nancial turbulence. When excessive prots appear,
the time of adjustment toward the threshold measuring the intensity of capital controls and
transaction costs is reduced after the abandonment of the dollar peg of RMB, as the force
of arbitrage plays a more important role in a more liquid and developed forward market of
foreign exchange. The eruption of the nancial crisis did not fully interrupt this process;
even it inates the yield dierential because of both increased liquidity risk and a US dollar
50As the market grows, banks increasingly price forwards and swaps based on the interest rate parity in
recent periods. The derivatives market is increasingly driven by nancial fundamentals (Peng et al., 2007).
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funding shortage. Moreover, a slightly lower speed of adjustment to the threshold implies
that the capital controls are eective in this context.
The PBOC announced on June 19 2010 the abandonment of the dollar peg that it adopted
as a \special measure" to deal with the period of nancial turbulence and the re-switching
to a managed oating regime with reference to a basket of currencies. This announcement
conrms the end of the anticipation of a stable RMB-dollar rate by the market. If the
Chinese monetary authority commits to implement this managed oat regime, as it did from
mid-2006 to mid-2008, more developed forward and derivatives markets as well as more open
capital accounts seem needed and can thus facilitate the internationalization of the RMB.
Because the option of lifting the capital controls to allow the full internationalization of the
RMB is less possible (Cheung et al., 2010), the issue of how the implementation of the capital
controls will be done is challenging and promising.
19
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erentials of major currencies/USD (Basis point)
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Figure 2: Covered dierentials of Asian currencies/USD with NDF market (Basis points)
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Figure 3: Covered interest yield dierentials of RMB (Basis points)
Source: Datastream WM/Reuters (daily data)
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Source: Datastream WM/Reuters and author’s calculation (daily data)
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Table 1: Summary statistics of RMB yield dierentials (3M-maturity)
Period Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Obs.
Whole 249.156 351.886 -1618.882 2052.697 1769
1st 366.790 192.988 100.289 1072.327 577
2nd 154.455 123.653 -108.764 655.957 535
3rd 222.961 518.072 -1618.882 2052.697 657
3rdc 222.961 215.792 -567.187 1464.838 657
Note: c denotes that the data used for this period are corrected.
Table 2: Stationarity tests
Period
N-P ADF modela M-TAR Model
MZa MZt k^  k^
Whole -14.8024** -2.7204** 12 4.3266* 12
1st -5.0047 -1.4061 5 5.5520** 8
2nd -1.0801 -0.7262 8 4.8262*b 1
3rd -3.7493 -1.3353 12 1.3486 12
3rdc -12.1675** -2.4665** 3 6.7896** 2
a For Ng-Perron test, only intercept is included in the model.
b M-TAR test is run on the demeaned series. k^ is the number of lags that is auto-selected by minimizing the
AIC criteria. To ensure the estimation run over the same sample for each sub-period, we x the number of
rst usable observation as the sum of k-max, the times of rst dierence of dependent variable and 1.
c When we discard the rst ten points of this period (because of their abnormal behavior due to the beginning
period eect of the new exchange rate regime), the power of the test is increased to 5%.
d *, **, and *** denote signicance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 3: LS unit root test with structural breaks
k^ TB Test statistic Critical value Break points
Level 8 2005:08:15, 2006:07:26 -4.1634  = (0:3; 0:5)
1st-dierence 6 2006:07:26, 2008:09:15 -3.0095  = (0:5; 0:8)
Notes: k^ is the optimal number of lagged rst-dierenced terms included in the unit root test to correct for
serial correlation. T^B denotes the estimated break points. Critical values are shown below for the two-break
minimum LM unit root test with linear trend (Model C) at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for a sample of size
T = 100, respectively, depending on the location of the breaks  = (TB1=T; TB2=T ). The critical values for
LM test with breaks come from Table 2 in Lee and Strazicich (2003). *, **, and *** denote signicance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Break Points Timing Critical Values
 = (TB1=T; TB2=T ) 1% 5% 10%
 = (0:2; 0:4) -6.16 -5.59 -5.27
 = (0:2; 0:6) -6.41 -5.74 -5.32
 = (0:2; 0:8) -6.33 -5.71 -5.33
 = (0:4; 0:6) -6.45 -5.67 -5.31
 = (0:4; 0:8) -6.42 -5.65 -5.32
 = (0:6; 0:8) -6.32 -5.73 -5.32
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Table 4: Autoregressive model with asymmetric GARCH eect
Period
Augmented AR(1) with Asymmetric GARCH(1,1) Ljung-Box Q-stat.
C0  HL k 0 1 1 1 SR SSR
1st 9.211 -0.033 20.66 0 28.349 0.479 0.742 -0.329 0.34[10] 0.17[10]
(0.000) (0.002) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 0.87[20] 0.21[20]
2nd 8.054 -0.049 13.80 1 347.656 0.180 0.689 -0.149 0.21[10] 0.19[10]
(0.005) (0.001) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.026) 0.21[20] 0.28[20]
3rd 0 -0.015 45.86 1 -0.865 0.137 0.915 -0.085 0.57[10] 0.99[10]
(0.015) (0.734) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 0.89[20] 0.997[20]
3rdc 15.265 -0.069 9.69 1 706.645 0.298 0.707 -0.160 0.74[10] 0.80[10]
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) 0.48[20] 0.98[20]
Estimated equation:
yt = C0 + yt 1 +
Pk
j=1 jyt j + t It 1 = 1 if t 1 < 0
2t = 0 + j
2
t 1 + j
2
t 1+1
2
t 1It 1 It 1 = 0 otherwise
Notes: The gures in squared brackets denote the number of correlations for which the Q-statistic is applied
to the residuals. SR denotes standardized residual and SSR squared standardized residual. HF is the half-life
calculated as ln(0:5)=ln(1 + out). c denotes the data used for this period is corrected ones. There is no
augmented term in the mean equation when k = 0.
Table 5: Non-linearity tests
Period Lag(n)
Tsay's TAR-F Hansen's sup-LM LLR
d = 1
1st 1, 4, 6 1.544 26.874*** 9.511**
(0.188) (0.004) (0.047)
2nd 1,2 0.366 11.966 4.190
(0.777) (0.189) (0.433)
3ndc 1 3.559** 9.779 4.169
(0.029) (0.123) (0.314)
Notes: AR models are tted with dierent lags for removing any serial correlation in the data, then TAR-
F and sup-LM tests are applied to the residual series of the model. For sup-LM test, heteroscedasticity
consistent estimates are used for calculating the standard errors; bootstrapped p-value (with 2000 draws) are
calculated and showed in parenthesis; d denotes the delay parameter. *, **, and *** denote signicance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. The fractiles of LLR test statistics are tabulated as follows based
on 600 simulations.
Fractiles P1 P2 P3
Minimum 0.406 0.787 0.104
01-%ile 0.686 0.977 0.470
05-%ile 1.216 1.496 0.896
10-%ile 1.519 1.813 1.174
25-%ile 2.453 2.692 1.804
Median 3.871 3.787 2.975
75-%ile 5.989 5.647 4.794
90-%ile 8.058 7.748 7.035
95-%ile 9.371 9.250 8.411
99-%ile 13.675 13.002 11.051
Maximum 19.824 36.390 12.750
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Table 7: Summary statistics of yield dierentials for period of crisis (Asian NDF markets)
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
hkd 6.405 12.794 -65.785 78.817
twd 266.883 240.915 -290.743 1136.227
krw 268.177 182.717 60.435 1116.773
php -81.870 148.875 -361.663 353.558
idr 237.304 173.773 -42.071 965.985
inr -103.595 190.196 -1477.311 225.5
cny 222.961 518.072 -1618.882 2052.697
Obs. 657
Table 8: Factor analysis with principal component approach (1)
Factor Eigenvalue Dierence Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 2.80195 1.72728 0.4670 0.4670
Factor2 1.07467 0.15833 0.1791 0.6461
Factor3 0.91634 0.33062 0.1527 0.7988
Factor4 0.58572 0.13863 0.0976 0.8964
Factor5 0.44709 0.27286 0.0745 0.9710
Factor6 0.17423 . 0.0290 1.0000
Variable Factor1 Factor2 Uniqueness
twd 0.5044 0.3483 0.6243
krw -0.7440 0.3594 0.3174
php -0.7525 -0.0886 0.4258
idr -0.3556 0.8333 0.1792
inr 0.7347 0.0234 0.4596
cny 0.8726 0.3486 0.1170
Notes: China mainland (CNY), Indonesia (IDR), India (INR), Philippines (PHP), South Korea (KRW) and
Taiwan (TWD), with the abbreviation of their currency in parenthesis.
Table 9: Factor analysis with principal component approach (2)
Factor Eigenvalue Dierence Proportion Cumulative
Factor1 1.86160 1.03497 0.6205 0.6205
Factor2 0.82663 0.51485 0.2755 0.8961
Factor3 0.31178 . 0.1039 1.0000
Variable Factor1 Uniqueness
twd 0.7035 0.5050
inr 0.7349 0.4599
cny 0.9091 0.1735
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